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I. Automobile Insurance

A. The Duty To Investigate Insurability

In recent years, the California Supreme Court has time and
again stressed the obligation of reasonable conduct that insurers owe to the public as well as to their insureds. This can
be seen in the Court's decision in Gray v. Zurich Insurance
Company/ where the Court held that the duty to defend under
a liability policy was measured not on the mere objective
standard of the language in the policy, but rather on the subjective standard of whether the insured might reasonably expect that he was entitled to a defense. Justice Tobriner's decision in Gray relied heavily on the doctrine of the adhesion
contract, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining
status between insurer and insured, the Court had to ascertain
that meaning of the contract which the insured would reasonably expect. The opinion concluded:
In summary, the individual consumer in the highly organized and integrated society of today must necessarily
rely upon institutions devoted to the public service to
perform the basic functions which they undertake. At
the same time the consumer does not occupy a sufficiently
strong economic position to bargain with such institutions as to specific clauses of their contracts of performance, and in any event, piecemeal negotiation would
sacrifice the advantage of uniformity. Hence the courts
in the field of insurance contracts have tended to require
that the insurer render the basic insurance protection
which it has held out to the insured. This obligation becomes especially manifest in the case in which the insurer
has attempted to limit the principal coverage by an unclear exclusionary clause. We test the alleged limitation
in the light of the insured's reasonable expectation of
coverage; that test compels the indicated outcome of the
present litigation. a
1. 65 Ca1.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
419 P.2d 168 (1966).
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The concept that language in insurance policies and conduct of insurers should be interpreted and judged by the standard of reasonableness in view of the public nature of an insurance contract was, of course, not new to either Justice Tobriner or to the Court. Four years before Gray, Justice
Tobriner, in Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New
York,s applied the adhesion contract doctrine in interpreting
a policy of airplane trip insurance sold by means of a vending
machine. Here too, the Court determined that the insured's
reasonable expectation in taking out the insurance was to obtain insurance protection for the entire trip, and that a policy
issued to cover the trip would likewise cover reasonable substituted transportation necessitated by emergencies such as
weather conditions and mechanical failure. In holding that
the insurer was bound to provide the coverage that the insured
might reasonably expect at the time he purchased the policy,
Justice Tobriner stated:
We must view the instant claim in the composite of its
special and unique circumstances. To equate the bargaining table, where each clause is the subject of debate,
to an automatic vending machine, which issues a policy
before it can even be read, is to ignore basic distinctions.
The proposition that the precedents must be viewed in the
light of the imperatives of the age of the machine has become almost axiomatic. Here the age of the machine is
no mere abstraction; it presents itself in the shape of an
instrument for the mass distribution of standard contracts. The exclusionary clause of that contract, upon
which the insurance company relies, is an unexpected
one. Its application in some circumstances would be
unconscionable. It is placed in an inconspicuous position of the document. In view of all these characteristics its rigid application would cast an unexpected burden upon the traveling public and would prefer formality
of phrase to the reality of the transaction. 4
3. 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
377 P.2d 284 (1962).
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Justice Tobriner's devotion to the concept of reasonableness
in interpretation of insurance policies was further defined and
enunciated in Insurance Company of North America v. Electronic Purification Company,5 reported in last year's edition of
Cal Law-Trends and Developments. 6 Once again, the Court
rejected an interpretation of a policy exclusion that would
have destroyed the insured's principal objective in purchasing
the insurance. In language that bears repeating, since the
people who write insurance policies seem to be totally oblivious to the problems they create, Justice Tobriner pleaded:
The instant case presents yet another illustration of the
dangers of the present complex structuring of insurance
policies. Unfortunately the insurance industry has become addicted to the practice of building into policies
one condition or exception upon another in the shape of
a linguistic Tower of Babel. We join other courts in
decrying a trend which both plunges the insured into a
state of uncertainty and burdens the judiciary with the
task of resolving it. We reiterate our plea for clarity
and simplicity in policies that fulfill so important a public service.7
The most important decision in the insurance field in 1969
was Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company,S another Tobriner opinion enunciating the requirement of reasonableness by insurers in fulfilling their responsibility to the pUblic. The Court held that an automobile
liability insurer must undertake a reasonable investigation of
the insured's insurability within a reasonable period of time
from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of the
policy. This duty directly inures to the benefit of third persons
injured by the insured; where the insurer has breached the
duty, it will be precluded from rescinding its policy on the
ground of misrepresentation or fraud by its insured in procur-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
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ing the policy. The Court analogized the insurer's duty to undertake a reasonable investigation of the insured's insurability
after issuance of the policy to its extracontractual duty to act
promptly on applications. It rejected the argument that the
injured person "stands in the shoes" of the insured; and it
further held that on satisfaction of a judgment attained by
the injured third person, the insurer possesses a remedy
against the insured for his misrepresentations.
The Court of Appeal in Barrera had held that an automobile liability insurer in California could not rescind its policy, no matter what the facts, and that its only remedy was to
cancel the policy on giving the requisite notice. This would
have placed an impossible burden on insurers, since it does
take a fair amount of time to get information from the Department of Motor Vehicles regarding an individual's past
driving record. The Supreme Court's decision rejected the
Court of Appeal reasoning, and held:
If the insurer does undertake a reasonable investigation
of insurability, it retains the statutory right granted in
section 650 of the Insurance Code to declare the rescission of the policy because of the material misrepresentation of the insured. When the insurer fails, however, to
conduct such a reasonable investigation it cannot assert
such a right of rescission. The insurer cannot complain
of the denial of the statutory right, when its conduct is
culpable and it directly contributes to the presence on the
highway of a financially irresponsible motorist. 9
In this case, State Farm's policy was in effect for one year,
seven months before the accident and two years before it
rescinded the policy. It had paid a prior claim involving the
comprehensive coverage. In a remarkable show of judicial
restraint, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for a determination of whether the insurer had conducted a reasonable investigation within a reasonable period
of time. The Court stated that factors to be taken into ac9. 71 Cal.2d 659, 678, 79 Cal. Rptr.
106, 114, 456 P.2d 674, 682 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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count in assessing the reasonableness of the insurer's course of
conduct in failing to investigate the insured's driving record
were, inter alia, the cost of obtaining the information from the
Department of Motor Vehicles, the availability of this information from the department or elsewhere, and the general administrative burden of making such an investigation. These
factors must be weighed against the importance of the protection of innocent members of the public against the consequences of automobile owners driving with voidable liability
policies.
Of course, if the obligation imposed upon insurers by Barrera is to be fair and just, it necessarily requires that insurers
be able to obtain the information they need in order to determine the truth or falsity of the information that the insured
has given to them. Claims have been raised in the past that
information regarding an individual's prior driving record
should be made confidential and not available to insurers. In
1968, Vehicle Code section 1806 was amended so that the
Department of Motor Vehicles only maintains records showing the driver's convictions and the traffic accidents for which
he was cited for a violation under the Vehicle Code. If, for
one reason or another, an individual has not been convicted of
a charged offense, the department will presumably not maintain or disseminate information regarding the incident. Likewise, if the driver was not cited by the investigating officer, he
may be able to misrepresent his prior accident record; and
the insurer will have no means for obtaining information regarding the misrepresentation even if it undertakes its investigation in accordance with the Barrera decision. Under Vehicle Code section 1807, the Department is not required to
maintain records relating to drivers of motor vehicles after the
records are, in the opinion of the director, no longer necessary,
except that records of convictions shall be maintained so long
as they may form the basis of license suspensions or revocations as prior convictions, or together with other records of
conviction constitute a person a "negligent driver." If the
Department advances its time table for destruction of records
in accordance with section 1807, the carriers may find themselves unable to check the truth or falsity of the insured's aphttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
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plication. Since the obligations imposed by Barrera will result in increased costs that will be borne by the general public,
it is imperative that the public preserve the sources of information available to insurers. The rule of reason is a two-way
street; certainly this would seem to be a reasonable requirement if Barrera is to be fairly applied.
B. Breach of Cooperation Clause

In the 1963 case of Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Co. lO
the State Supreme Court overruled prior cases that held that
prejudice was presumed from an insured's violation of a cooperative clause. The Court further held that the burden of
proving that a breach of the cooperation clause resulted in substantial prejudice was on the insurer. In Billington v. Interinsurance Exchange of Southern California,l1 the Court extended Campbell by ruling that in order for the insurer to
show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the insured to
cooperate in his defense, it must establish at the very least
that if the cooperation clause had not been breached there
was a substantial likelihood the trier of fact would have found
in the insured's favor. "A less stringent standard," the Court
stated "would not be consonant with our holding in Campbell."l2

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Billington decision is not the holding but rather the fact that the Court rejected so many arguments advanced by both the plaintiff and the
various attorneys appearing as amici curiae on behalf of the
plaintiff. First, the Court held that the insurer's refusal to
accept settlement proposals made by the plaintiff within the
policy limits did not estop the insurer from relying on the defense of the insured's breach of the cooperation clause, especially where no bad faith was shown in the insurer's handling of the insured's defense or in its failure to negotiate a
compromise settlement. The Court rejected plaintiff's reli10. 60
384 P.2d
11. 71
456 P.2d

Cal.2d 303, 32 Cal. Rptr.827,
155 (1963).
Ca1.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 326,
982 (1969).
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ance on a statement in Crisci v. Security Insurance Compani 3
that perhaps an insurer could be liable for any judgment
exceeding the policy limits if it refuses an offer of settlement
within those limits. It would be unwarranted in applying the
proposed rule where the insurer was unable to maintain any
defense to the action on behalf of the insured as a result of the
insured's failure to cooperate in his defense. Next, the Court
held that just because the insured was covered under the
assigned risk plan, the insurer would not be precluded from
raising his violation of the cooperation clause as a defense.
In this regard, Justice Mosk, speaking for the Court in Billington, stated:
This contention is based upon the erroneous premise
that assigned risk policies are the equivalent of compulsory insurance. 14
The Court also rejected plaintiff's reliance on the provisions of
the Financial Responsibility Law,15 noting:
If a court finds that there was a substantial likelihood
that the insured would have prevailed had he cooperated
in his defense, there is little danger that an innocent plaintiff will be denied recovery by the insurer's reliance upon
the cooperation clause. 16
Amici curiae claimed that the insurer's attempt to disclaim
liability because of an insured's breach of a cooperation clause
amounted to a cancellation and that a cancellation may not
affect accidents which occurred prior thereto. The Court
disposed of this argument with the terse comment that "no
case to our knowledge has viewed the breach of such a clause
as a cancellation. 00l7 Similarly, the Court rejected the contention that a cooperation clause defense was in derogation of
the coverage required by Vehicle Code sections 16451 and
16452 and Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
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Company. IS It also held that even if the insurer has certified
to the Department of Motor Vehicles within twenty days following the accident that its policy was in effect at the time of
the accident, it may still rely on the cooperation clause where
discovery of the breach of cooperation could not be made
within the 20-day period. Finally, the Court held that if the
insurer has been found to encourage noncooperation or to
have shown lack of diligence in seeking the insured's presence
to participate in his defense, it will be precluded from relying
on the cooperation clause.
As indicated above, this writer believes that it is significant
that the Court rejected so many technical arguments advanced
by counsel for the claimant, while at the same time adopting
a rule that justly places on the insurer the burden of showing
that the insured's failure to cooperate prejudiced the company
in its effort to persuade the jury or judge to find in the insured's
favor in the prior action. It would appear that the Court is
willing to take a realistic view toward the problems of insurers
and their insureds, and will not accept every wild argument
advanced by claimants' counsel. This, of course, is befitting
a Court that has rejected so many technical defenses advanced
on behalf of insurers in recent years.
C. Premiums-Recitals as to Payment
It has been said that hard cases make bad law. It might
also be observed that hard decisions sometimes spur legislators
to change the law .19
18. 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359
(1957).
19. Last year in this article (Seligson, INSURANCE, Cal Law-Trends and
Developments 1969, p. 493, we noted
legislative action following reviewing
court decisions in Abbott v. Interinsurance Exchange, 260 Cal. App.2d 528,
67 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1968) and Lopez v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 250 Cal. App.2d 210, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (1967). In each case, there
was a clear disagreement between the
CAL LAW 1970
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dealt with an exclusion in an automobile liability policy of a person designated by name (which the court held
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but did not take out coverage to protect either himself or the public (the
court could find no statutory authorization for the exclusion, and so the Legislature provided it).
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During 1969, the most striking example of action and reaction by the State Supreme Court and the Legislature arose
out of a decision by the Supreme Court involving a recital of
payment of the premium in an insurance policy, where the insured had not in fact paid the premium. In Sawyer v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company,20 the Court held that a
clause in an automobile liability policy delivered unconditionally to the insured, stating that the policy was "in consideration of the premium paid," constituted an "acknowledgment" within the meaning of Insurance Code section 484 that
the premium had been paid and that under the statute the
acknowledgment was, in the absence of fraud, conclusive evidence of its payment and precluded the insurer not only from
claiming that the policy had not gone into effect at all, on the
ground of nonpayment, but also from cancelling the policy on
the same ground at any time during the premium period. The
Court further held that the company was estopped from claiming that it had canceled the policy prior to the accident for
nonpayment of the premium. The trial court had properly
refused to receive evidence of such attempted cancellation,
where, although the insured had failed to comply with the
terms of an extension of limited personal credit for such payment, the policy had been unconditionally delivered to him
and contained an "acknowledgment" of the payment within
the meaning of the statute.
Justices McComb and Burke dissented, primarily on the
basis that the insurer had a right, on proper notice before a
loss, to exercise the cancellation right reserved to it in the
policy. Justice McComb stated his view of the proper interpretation of Insurance Code section 484, as follows:
Rather, it appears to me from the clear language of the
statute, that the Legislature intended to provide that
if the receipt of premium is acknowledged in the policy,
a binding insurance contract has come into existence even
though (1) the policy provides that it shall not be binding until the premium is actually paid, and (2) the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
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premium has not been paid. The section does not in any
way indicate that such binding contract of insurance is
immune from cancellation, when the right of cancellation
has been reserved to the insurer in the policy.l
Justice McComb's dissenting interpretation of the statute
was promptly codified by the Legislature, which amended section 484, to provide:
An acknowledgment in a policy of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment so far as
to make the policy binding. Notwithstanding such acknowledgment, a policy may be canceled effective at such
times as otherwise permitted by law for nonpayment of
all or any portion of the premium which is actually unpaid if such cancellation right is reserved to the insurer
in the policy.
D. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Insurance Code section 11580.2, provides that no policy of
motor vehicle liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in
California to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, or shall
be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in California
upon any motor vehicle then principally used or principally
garaged in California without the uninsured motorist coverage
required by the statute, unless the insurer and named insured
have agreed in writing to delete such coverage. In Modglin
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,2 the
court held that this provision applied not only to new policies
but also to renewals of existing policies. Thus, where a policy
was renewed on a motor vehicle "then principally used or
principally garaged" in California, the statute provided uninsured motorist coverage as a matter of law unless the coverage
had been waived by the named insured by an agreement in
writing. The court felt that the limitation of the statute only
to new policies would permit insurance carriers to circumvent
1. 69 Cal.2d 801, 812, 73 Cal. Rptr.
232, 239, 447 P.2d 344, 351. See 1969
amendment, Stats. 1969, Ch. 536.
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the statute by the mere expedient of renewing their policies
instead of issuing new ones.
The Legislature also acted in the same area by amending
the statute so as to provide that the written agreement deleting uninsured motorist coverage could be made either "prior
to or subsequent to the issuance or renewal of a policy." In
the past, some companies required the insured to sign a waiver
with each renewal of the policy. Under the statutory change,
it would seem that that is no longer necessary. Presumably,
however, a waiver can be withdrawn by the insured
with respect to subsequent renewals, so as to prevent renewal of the policy automatically carrying forward an earlier
waIver.
Several other statutory changes of significance were made
in this field. Under the prior statute, a company could reduce
payments made under uninsured motorist coverage by
amounts paid or payable under automobile medical payments
insurance. As of January 1, 1971, however, an insurer may
deduct medical payments only from the damages which the
insured is entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist
coverage. Thus, if the insured's damages are $50,000 and his
uninsured motorist coverage is $15,000, the insurer will not
get the benefit of the reduction for medical payments coverage
after the effective date of the statute. As can be seen, this statutory change will be significant only in cases where the damages exceed the policy limits. This seems fair, since the theory
against double recovery has no application in such cases.
Under Insurance Code section 11580.5, no award made in
an uninsured motorist arbitration proceeding shall be deemed
to be res judicata or collateral estoppel in any court action
which may be pending or brought by the insured against the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. In 1969,
the Legislature adopted a conforming amendment to Insurance Code section 11580.2 (f), so that an award or a judgment confirming an award shall not be conclusive on any party
in any action or proceeding between (1) the insured, his insurer, his legal representative, or his heirs and (2) the uninsured motorist.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
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The statute of limitations for uninsured motorist proceedings has been a trap for the unwary. Under Insurance Code
section l1580.2(i), an insured who has an uninsured motorist
claim has one year from the date of accident to either file suit
for bodily injury against the uninsured motorist, or reach an
agreement as to the amount due under the policy with the insurer, or formally institute arbitration proceedings. Many
attorneys, representing minors, were not aware of the fact
that the one-year limitation applied to all claimants, including
minors; and this writer suspects that more than one legal malpractice claim has arisen because of this problem. In 1969,
an effort was made to conform the statute of limitations for
uninsured motorist claims to the regular rule set forth in the
Code of Civil Procedure for injury actions, including the exception of time during which a person is under disability as
provided in section 352. This attempt did not succeed. However, the Legislature did adopt Insurance Code section
l1580.2(j), which provides that an uninsured motorist carrier
whose insured has made a claim under the coverage, which
is still pending, shall, at least 30 days before the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations, notify its insured in
writing of the applicable statute. Failure of the insurer to
provide this written notice operates to toll any applicable statute of limitation or other time limitation for a period of 30
days from the date the written notice is actually given. Certainly, this is not a satisfactory solution to the problem. However, it does afford protection that did not previously exist.

E. Loading and Unloading
The courts in recent years have given increasing scope to
the "loading and unloading" coverage contained in automobile
liability insurance policies. This trend continued during
1969. In Brunswig Wholesale Druggist v. Travelers Insurance Company,3 a garbage truck driver, who was in the process of collecting trash from Brunswig's waste well, was injured
by the negligence of Brunswig's employee, who lost control of
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a metal cart while attempting to empty the cart into the opening of the chute to the waste well. At the time of the accident,
the driver was about twenty feet from the point where the
truck was parked. Although the driver was not injured by
anything used in loading the truck, the court held that the
accident came within the "loading and unloading" coverage of
defendant's truck policy. The court justified this on the basis
that the duties of Brunswig's employee included the dumping
of trash down the chute into the waste well; and that this was
part of the "continuous process" by which the trash would be
loaded from the well onto the truck.
It seems that we are fast approaching the point where any
injury to a delivery man or a truck driver will be covered under
the truck policy. Under Brunswig, if you leave milk bottles
in such a position that the milkman trips over them and is injured, you would be covered under the milk company's truck
policy. Query: What if your child leaves a skate in the same
place and the milkman is injured? While that may not be part
of the "continuous process" of loading or unloading, will a
different result apply or will some court hold that the landowner's duty to keep the pathway free from objects is a "step
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the truck was
being used,,4 so as to come within the truck policy?
It may be that the answer to the above question was given
in Shippers Development Co. v. General Insurance Co. of
America. 5 In that case, a produce dealer's truck driver, who
had come onto the premises of the plaintiff supplier for the
purpose of icing the produce in his employer's truck and trailer, was injured when he fell off the end of the supplier's dock
after he got out of the truck but before he could open the trailer door for the purpose of icing the truck. The court held
that his case came within the "complete operations"6 doctrine, and that the failure of a consignor or consignee, who is
4. 273 Cal. App.2d 11, 15, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 859, 862; see also American Auto.
Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 106 Cal. App.2d 630, 638,
235 P.2d 645, 649 (1951).
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using a vehicle for loading or unloading, to maintain a safe
place for that activity is an act or omission which has a
causal relationship to the use of the vehicle so as to come
within the terms of the truck policy. It looks more and more
as though there is coverage for the homeowner whose child
leaves a skate in the path of the milkman.

II. Life Insurance
A. Application Misrepresentation-Incontestable
Clauses
The furnishing of a copy of the application to the insured
or to his beneficiary is not required by statute in California.
In Metzinger v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company/ however, the insurer chose to enlarge the incontestable provisions
required by Insurance Code section 10206, by providing, in a
group life insurance policy and a certificate of individual insurance issued thereunder, that no statement made by the insured relating to his insurability shall be used in contesting the
validity of the insurance unless a copy of the application had
been furnished to the insured or to his beneficiary. The Court
properly ruled that the insurer could not escape the application
of that provision most beneficial to the insured. The purpose
of such a provision is to provide an opportunity to review
the application while the insured is still alive, and to correct
misstatements that might have appeared therein. The language of the provision, the Court opined, was calculated to
lead an insured to believe that if a copy of the application
concerning his statements had not been furnished during his
lifetime, such statements might not be relied on by the insurer
after his death.
B. Effective Date of Coverage-Accidental Death
In Slobojan v. Western Traveler's Life Insurance Company, 8 the State Supreme Court was faced with a situation
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where an individual died after signing an application for life
insurance but before accepting delivery of the policy. As
might be expected, the insurer, confronted with the realization
that the risk was not as desirable as it had first seemed, chose
to contest the claim by asserting that the policy had not gone
into effect. This effort to evade coverage was summarily rejected on motion for summary judgment granted in favor of
the claimant. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Plaintiff's decedent signed defendant's application for life
insurance in the amount of $25,000, with double indemnity
covering accidental death with respect to the first $5,000. He
paid the first month's premium of $16.14 by check, which
defendant deposited in its account. Defendant's agent explained to him that the insurance would not take effect until
the application was accepted by the company and a policy
issued and accepted by him and that he would be required to
take a physical examination. The decedent took the physical
examination at defendant's request; and on the same date, defendant issued the policy and forwarded it to its agent. The
agent thereupon notified decedent that the policy was ready to
be delivered but that the premium for double indemnity would
be $.44 per month higher, since he was a police officer who
made arrests. Decedent told the agent that he had been inquiring about other policies and would let her know whether
or not he wished to accept defendant's policy. Five days later
he died. On the reverse side of a "conditional receipt" given
to the decedent for his first premium was language indicating
that payment of the first month's premium on date of application would put the policy into effect on either the date of
application or date of medical examination, whichever was
later. The Court gave effect to the language in the "conditional receipt," and held that the contract of insurance arose
on the insurer's receipt of the completed application and the
first premium payment. In so holding, the Court followed its
opinion in Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company,9
where the Court stated:
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The understanding of an ordinary person is the standard which must be used in construing the contract, and
such a person upon reading the application would believe
that he would secure the benefit of immediate coverage
by paying the premium in advance of delivery of the
policy. There is an obvious advantage to the company
in obtaining payment of the premium when the application is made, and it would be unconscionable to permit
the company, after using language to induce payment
of the premium at that time, to escape the obligation
which an ordinary applicant would reasonably believe
had been undertaken by the insurer. Moreover, defendant drafted the clause, and had it wished to make clear
that its satisfaction was a condition precedent to a contract, it could easily have done so by using unequivocal
terms. 10
The company's effort to avoid the double-indemnity accidental death provision likewise met with failure. On the
date Mr. Slobojan died, he was on regular duty as a deputy
sheriff and started a chase on foot after a crime suspect. The
chase involved running and fence climbing, and while so engaged, he tripped and fell. An autopsy disclosed a pre-existing mild atherosclerosis, but that such condition was nonmanifest and nondisabling. The trial court found that the
chase created an unusual physical stress and strain on the decedent's entire body, which was involuntary, reasonably unexpected and unanticipated by him, and resulted in injury,
accidental in origin. The accidental death provision stated
that the death must result "directly and independently of all
other causes from bodily injuries caused by accident" and
must not have resulted from "disease" or "bodily or mental
infirmity." The Court affirmed the holding of "accidental
death," restating the rule in Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co./ 1 that:
The correct rule is that the presence of preexisting
10. 43 Ca1.2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d
633, 636.
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disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer from liability if the accident is the proximate cause of death;
and that recovery may be had even though a diseased
or infirm condition appears to actually contribute to
cause the death if the accident sets in progress the chain
of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime
or moving cause. 12
III. Insurance and the Adhesion Contract Doctrine

As indicated earlier in this article, the doctrine of adhesion
contract has been utilized by the State Supreme Court in determining the reasonable application of language contained in
insurance policies. It is likewise interesting to note the application of the doctrine by the Courts of Appeal in dealing
with cases where an insurer is attempting to defeat the reasonable expectation of its insured through technical language
buried in the policy. Running through these cases appears to
be the element of fairness, which the courts utilize in reaching
a result that comports with the reasonable expectation of the
insured.
In Schmidt v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company,t3
the insurer attempted to limit its monthly disability benefits,
in an accident and disability insurance policy, to disabilities
"commencing . . . within twenty days after the date of the
accident." The insured's disability did not start until 75 days
after his accident; and under rules of strict application of contract language, his claim would be denied. Indeed, that was
the ruling of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeal reversed judgment with directions to enter judgment for the insured. It did so on the basis that the limitation unexpectedly
and inharmoniously appeared as a subsidiary clause in a sea
of print, preceded and followed by the policy's emphasis on
the insurer's major promises as to the benefits to be paid in the
event of total disability. In refusing to apply the buried language, the court stated:
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We do not dispute respondent's right to insert in its contracts of insurance a provision that will limit a buyer's
right to recover benefits to those cases where total disability is caused'. . . within twenty days after the date
of the accident.' We merely say that where, as here, such
an exclusionary provision disappoints the reasonable expectations of the buyer, and fails to pass the '. . . conspicuous, plain and clear . . .' test prescribed by our
Supreme Court, it cannot operate to defeat the buyer's
rights. 14
Another illustration of this principle may be found in Oil
Base, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company/5 where an insurer attempted to limit its general comprehensive liability insurance policy to "accidents which occur during the policy
period within the United States of America, its territories or
possessions, or Canada." The insured, during the policy period, sold some bags of its drilling mud to a South American
company; and while the mud was stored in a warehouse belonging to the purchaser in Venezuela, it caught fire from spontaneous combustion. The company attempted to avoid coverage on the basis that the accident had occurred in Venezuela.
Here too, the trial court ruled in favor of the insurer; and once
again, judgment was reversed on appeal. The reviewing
court found an ambiguity in the word "accident" and, more
significantly, applied the doctrine of adhesion contract in finding in favor of the insured. In doing so, the court noted that
the insured was charged and paid premiums on its gross business, foreign and domestic, and did not know that the exclusion clause was in the contract. Under such circumstances,
although the court was sensitive to the fact that the exclusion
clause was not in fine print, it was still persuaded that the
principles set forth in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Compani 6
applied; and it held that the insurer had wrongfully refused to
defend its insured.
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Finally, of particular interest in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in Slobojan v. Western Travelers' Life Insurance
Company/7 is the case of Young v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company/8 which also dealt with the question of a conditional receipt given by a life insurance agent to an applicant
after payment of the premium but before issuance of the
policy. In Young, the court found that the language of the
conditional receipt was not ambiguous and misleading, where
it emphatically stated that the policy applied for would become
effective "if and only if" all conditions "precedent" thereafter
enumerated in the same paragraph had been complied with,
and then made it reasonably clear that the only coverage provided to the applicant during the interim was an accidental
death benefit. The court stated that it could not be said that
the applicant, presumably a person of ordinary intelligence,
would have been misled into believing that he was immediately
covered by the insurance policy applied for if he had been
aware of the pertinent clause contained in the application and
if he had carefully read the conditional receipt. Nevertheless,
the court reversed judgment in favor of the insurer on the
ground that there was no evidence (nor a court finding) that
the limited interim coverage contained in the conditional receipt was ever called to the insured's attention. There was
evidence that the agent of the company had filled out the part
of the application containing the clause on the deceased's behalf and then secured his signature. There was also evidence
that the deceased first mistakenly signed the application under
the medical part, thus indicating that he had not read it; and
also that after he signed the proper part of the application, he
immediately paid the premium and was handed the conditional
receipt by the agent, apparently without comment. In ruling
in favor of the beneficiary to the policy, the court stated:
It is now firmly settled that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion between parties not equally situated.
(citations) Consequently, the insurer, as the dominant
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and expert party in the field, must not only draft such
contracts in unambiguous terms but must bring to the
attention of the insured all provisions and condition
which create exceptions or limitations on the coverage.
(citations) Manifestly, it should have even a greater
duty to call attention to such provisions or conditions
when they are contained in receipts given to an applicant
after he has paid the premium in advance, because the
very acceptance of an advance premium by the carrier
tends naturally toward an understanding of immediate
coverage though it be temporary and terminable. (citation) In short, to the ordinary layman, payment of the
insurance premium constitutes payment for immediate
protection, and it is unlikely that he would carefully read
the fine print contained in a receipt unless he was given
the incentive to do so by the carrier's agent. 19
This writer believes that the approach taken by the courts
in the above cases is salutary and to be commended. He likewise hopes that these principles are applied with equal force
in other areas of adhesion contracts, where the consumer needs
just as much protection. All too often, the individual who
has borrowed money discovers the existence of a "due-on-sale"
clause or a pre-payment penalty which it would be unconscionable to apply. Yet, the courts have given effect to such provisions contained in adhesion contracts, notwithstanding the
punitive effect of the clause and the fact that the clause was
not called to the attention of the borrower at the time the
contract was entered into. If the doctrine of adhesion contract is to receive its full flower, it cannot and should not be
limited to the insurance field.
19. 272 Cal. App.2d 453,460-461,77
Cal. Rptr. 382, 387, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568.
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